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There are two types of philosophy of mind in Brentano: (A) Aristotelian, and (B) genuinely 
Brentanian. The former (A) is to be found in the Aristotelica series; and by (B) I understand the 
content of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. The manuscripts for its unwritten parts and 
Brentano’s lectures on God and immortality of the soul surprisingly fall into A. These lines of 
thought are so different that it can be astonishing that they were authored by one person. In my 
paper I will try to show the roots of this dichotomy as well as to check whether there is a conflict 
between these theories, and, if so, whether they can be reconciled. These are not only two different 
philosophical theories, but at least one of them is a manifestation of a world view, and a key to it 
can be found in Brentano’s biography.
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Franz Brentano – a profile
Franz Brentano (1838–1917) was a German philosopher who worked in numerous 
fields: metaphysics, ontology, psychology, logic, theology, ethics and history of phi-
losophy. He is known mainly for reintroducing the scholastic notion of intentional-
ity into contemporary philosophy (Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (PES), 
1 The research was financed from the assets awarded by The National Science Center in Kraków for 
the postdoctoral intership upon the decision no. DEC-2013/08/S/HS1/00184/2.




1874).2 In fact, as one can see in the lines cited below, also known as “the inten-
tionality quote,” Brentano did not use the exact word “intentionality.” He spoke of 
“intentional/mental inexistence” of an object in our mind. Upon this notion he was 
able to build his very modern philosophy of mind (i.e. division of mental phenom-
ena into three classes of presentations, judgments and phenomena of love and hate, 
self-consciousness, synchronic unity of consciousness), but on the other hand – so to 
speak – to create a link between medieval logic and psychology as well as contem-
porary philosophy.
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called 
the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly 
unambiguously, relation to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood 
here as a reality), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as 
object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something 
is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire 
desired and so on.3
Brentano is also famous as a teacher of many significant philosophers (and not 
only philosophers); among whom we can count Edmund Husserl, Anton Marty, 
Christian von Ehrenfels, Alexius Meinong, Carl Stumpf, Hugo Bergmann, Alfred 
Kastil, Tomáš Masaryk, Sigmund Freud, and Kazimierz Twardowski (to mention 
just a few).4 The last of these students of Brentano, Kazimierz Twardowski, was the 
founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School, which makes Brentano something of a godfa-
ther, so to speak, of Polish analytic philosophy. Interestingly, there was no proper 
school of Brentano in Vienna. On the one hand among his students one can find all 
the distinguished names mentioned above, and some would even like to see Franz 
Kafka among them (he was friends with Hugo Bergmann), although he lived and 
worked in Prague. On the other hand, as we learn from Husserl’s memoirs5 (Husserl 
was Brentano’s student in Vienna in winter 1884/1885 and 1885/1886), Brentano did 
not believe himself to have created a school. Brentano is remembered as somebody 
who gave momentum to phenomenology, revolutionised epistemology and psychol-
ogy, influenced the Lvov-Warsaw School, inspired British analytic philosophy and 
raised a couple of generations of influential philosophers, but he died in the belief 
that there was no proper heir or continuator to his work. One can sometimes have 
2 See also W. Huemer, Franz Brentano [in:] The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 
Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/brentano/ [accessed: 
30.10.2014]. 
3 F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, 
L.L. McAlister, London, New York 1995. p. 68.
4 Even Martin Heidegger, although they never met in person. In Unterwegs zur Sprache, Heidegger 
said that it was Brentano’s book Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles that 
awoke his interest for philosophy.
5 E. Husserl, Wspomnienia o Franzu Brentano [in:] F. Brentano, Arystoteles i jego światopogląd, 
trans. S. Kamińska, Kraków 2012, p. 23–34. The memoirs of Edmund Husserl are taken from Oskar 
Kraus’s book Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre. Mit Beiträgen von Carl 
Stumpf und Edmund Husserl (Munich 1919). I incorporated them into my translation of: Franz Brentano, 
Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung (Aristotle and His World View).
287
the feeling that Brentano’s indirect influence on philosophy, i.e. via his students, was 
greater than the direct one. And his conviction of dying “childless” was rooted in 
his peculiar view on the master-student relationship, which had a lot to do with his 
“affinity” with Aristotle (about which more below). However, in his book Austrian 
Philosophy, The Legacy of Franz Brentano (p. 20), Barry Smith gives a much more 
trivial explanation of the lack of a school of Brentano. According to him, the school 
was not established because the authorities of the University in Vienna did not return 
to him his professorship (given in 1874 and lost in 1880 – more on this below), and 
this is why Brentano was forced to teach as Privatdozent for the rest of his life. As 
a result, the place that could have been taken by Brentano and his pupils (who instead 
dispersed all over Europe) was taken by Moritz Schlick and his agnostic group of 
followers, who fought phenomenology as a manifestation of old metaphysics. Thus, 
Anton Marty and Christian von Ehrenfels settled in Prague, Carl Stumpf in Berlin, 
Alexius Meinong in Graz, Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov, etc. Although this was 
a hardship for Brentano, it had a huge (and positive) impact on European philosophy 
in the broad sense. Had the school been established in Vienna, the scholars would 
not have taken all the positions at various universities, and thus the fruitful diffusion 
would not have taken place.
Surprisingly, it still remains unknown that there was a completely different side 
to Brentano, another current of his philosophical work, in which he was incessantly 
engaged from 1862 till 1911.6 And the thing he was so fiercely devoted to was his 
Aristotelian studies. In this very long period of almost 50 years, Brentano wrote the 
following books on Aristotle, which are now known under the common name of 
Aristotelica: Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (On 
the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, 1862), Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, ins-
besondere seine Lehre vom nous poietikos (The Psychology of Aristotle, 1867), Über 
den Creatianismus des Aristoteles (On Aristotle’s Creationism, 1882), Aristoteles’ 
Lehre vom Ursprung des menschlichen Geistes (Aristotle’s Theory of the Origin of 
Human Soul/Intellect, 1911), Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung (Aristotle and 
His World View, 1911). There is also the rather considerable Nachlass: Über Aristo-
teles (On Aristotle, 1986), plus numerous manuscripts.
To order the facts, it will be useful to introduce a division into two currents of 
Brentano’s philosophy of mind. I call these currents A and B, because one stands 
for Aristotle and the other for Brentano. I will start with the latter one, as it is better 
known. Representative of B is the content of Psychology from an Empirical Stand-
point. In this book, Franz Brentano exchanges the traditional conception of substan-
tial soul for a chain/bundle7 of mental phenomena/acts with no underlying substra-
6 S. Kamińska, Arystoteles według Franza Brentano. Dyskusyjna interpretacja / Komentarz do prze-
kładu fragmentu dzieła F. Brentany Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung, “Kwartalnik Filozoficzny” 
2010, vol. XXXVIII, no. 1; S. Kamińska, What Can Grow from the Divine Seed? The Divinity of Human 
Beings According to Aristotle, “Studia Religiologica” 2012, vol. 45 (3).
7 Bundle theory, originated by David Hume, very broadly speaking states that objects consist of 
bundles of properties and that there is no substance/substratum in which they inhere. Substance theory 
says that a substance is a property-bearer that is distinct from its properties. Substance theory is to be 
distinguished from bundle theory, but also from the theory of the bare particular (i.e. substance with no 
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tum. In doing so he is influenced by David Hume (the famous critic of the notions 
of substance and causation), Gustav Theodor Fechner (an experimental psychologist 
who tried to develop an entire world view without resorting to the hypothesis that 
there exist any mysterious substances besides phenomena perceived by our senses 
or inner observation), Wilhelm Wundt (who founded the first laboratory of experi-
mental psychology), et al. The theory of mental life described in PES has been very 
influential ever since. Brentano’s ideas included in this work are still alive among 
contemporary philosophers, and the literature on the subject is vast.
The A current, on the other hand, has not been so “successful”, and for several 
reasons has not found its way into the philosophical mainstream. In the Aristotelica 
series (as well as in unpublished8 parts of PES), Brentano is – as the name suggests 
– a thorough-going Aristotelian. What the name does not suggest is that this Aristote-
lianism has a very strong Thomistic admixture: a theistic account of a personal God, 
immortal soul as a substratum for mental phenomena, creationism, “creation” of the 
world and creation of particular souls in time.9 It is a full-blown Christian Aristoteli-
anism to be honest (which shall mean that A not only stands for Aristotle, but also for 
Aquinas), and this fact finds a plausible explanation in Brentano’s biography, which 
for a philosopher was very eventful. 
The story of his life
The book that opens Aristotelica, Franz Brentano’s doctorate entitled Von der man-
nigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, is one of the milestones of his 
biography.10 This work is dedicated to Friedrich Adolph Trendelenburg, the only per-
properties). Brentano in PES rejects the idea of the soul conceived as the bearer of its mental phenom-
ena, as something different from them (he rejects the substance theory). He speaks of a chain of mental 
phenomena with no underlying substratum, which is why I decided to call it chain/bundle theory. Un-
fortunately, he does not develop this issue, and we cannot say how the mental phenomena are intercon-
nected. He has an account of the synchronic unity of consciousness, i.e. inner perception informs us of the 
coexistence of mental phenomena in a particular moment of time, but there is no diachronic unity of con-
sciousness, i.e. we do not know how they coexist over time, which – in the long run – amounts to the 
problem of identity/personhood, and this may be the cause of Brentano’s decision to stick to substance 
theory in his other writings. 
8 At first, Brentano planned to publish six books of PES. However, he only managed to publish two 
of them, and the rest remained in manuscript. 
9 When I speak of the creation of the world I put the word “creation” in quotation marks, because 
Brentano was strongly inspired by Aquinas’ concept of creatio continua, which aims to reconcile the act 
of creation with the eternity of the world. For Aquinas the world was “created” by God, but on the other 
hand it is not possible to indicate the concrete point in time. The human notion of time does not apply 
to God, who is beyond time. And thus we say that God lends its existence to the world. It is a fusion of 
Aristotelianism (eternal world) and Christianity (creation). Creatio continua is to be understood as if God 
were creating the world all the time and at the same time the world were eternal. Brentano subscribes 
to this point of view. When it comes to the soul, Brentano also follows Aquinas and says that the soul is 
created by God and incarnated at a special moment of the foetus’s development, called perfecta dispositio 
corporis.
10 It was also a milestone in Heidegger’s biography, as I stated above.
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son – according to Brentano, of course – who understood Aristotle. Trendelenburg 
(1802–1872), Brentano’s Berliner teacher, was a philosopher and a philologist. He 
was one of the godfathers of the 19th-century Aristotelian revival. In 1833 he pub-
lished a critical edition of Aristotle’s De Anima, which was seminal for Brentano’s 
development as he grounds his theory of intellectual soul and the deity-humans re-
lationship mostly in this work. What could also have been important for the young 
Brentano was Trendelenburg’s conviction that the right explanation for the world 
can only be given in terms of the final cause (teleology!). Both Trendelenburg and 
Brentano also believed that there are more similarities than differences between Plato 
and Aristotle, and both shared an aversion to German idealism – so much for philo-
sophical taste. 
Another important figure in the formation of Brentano’s A world view was Franz 
Jakob Clemens (1815–1862). Brentano met him in Münster, where he spent two se-
mesters, and quickly became intellectually and emotionally attached to him. He later 
called him “the professor of his heart”, and it was Clemens, not Trendelenburg, who 
was the supervisor of Brentano’s doctoral thesis. Clemens was a Catholic philosopher 
and a Jesuit. He acquainted Brentano with scholastics, and it is often said that he was 
responsible for the Catholic trait in Brentano’s writings and could even have influ-
enced Brentano’s decision to become a Catholic priest. Unfortunately, Clemens died 
in 1862, in the year of Brentano’s doctoral defence. 
To sum up this stage of Brentano’s biography, one should say that Trendelenburg 
inspired him with Aristotle, and Clemens with Thomas Aquinas, and these are by far 
the two strongest influences in A.11 There is also the Leibnizian thread, which would 
be worth elaborating on but, unfortunately, to do so would surpass the scope of this 
paper.
The years 1864–1873 were the period of Brentano’s priesthood. This was put to 
an end (although the formal resignation fell in 1879) because Brentano contradicted 
the dogma of papal infallibility (Vatican Council I, 1869–1870): “(...) when the dec-
laration of papal infallibility caused Roman Catholic lines in Germany to be sharply 
drawn, Brentano found he could no longer in good conscience remain a Catholic...”12 
Nevertheless, in his heart, he remained a believer. In March 1873 Brentano had to 
resign from his professorship in Würzburg as it was formally attached to his priest-
hood. In 1874 he was awarded a professorship in Vienna, which he happily accepted, 
but which he also left six years later due to his marriage (in Austria it was forbidden 
for a former priest to get married, and thus Brentano accepted Saxon citizenship). 
The above sentence contains two crucial facts in Brentano’s biography. Not only 
does it explain why he remained a Privatdozent for the rest of his career (which – 
as Husserl13 relates – made him rather unhappy), but it also gets to the bone of the 
genesis of the B current in Brentano’s philosophy of mind (this is, of course, one of 
11 See also S. Kamińska, Nieznane oblicze Franza Brentano [in:] F. Brentano, Arystoteles i jego 
światopogląd...
12 A.J. Burgess, Brentano as a Philosopher of Religion, “International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion” 1974, no. 2, p. 83.
13 E. Husserl, op.cit.
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the possible explanations). Namely, after leaving Würzburg Brentano was in need 
of a position. This, however, required that he shake off the well-deserved scholastic 
label he had earned in the preceding years. Some specialists on Brentano (including 
Peter Simons14) believe that he wrote Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint in 
order to appear a much more modern philosopher than he really was. Nowadays, we 
might use the meaningful expression “fake it to make it” to describe this. In his in-
troduction to PES from 1995, Simons calls it Brentano’s “passport out of Würzburg”. 
This justification would also explain why only two of six intended books of PES were 
published, and the rest remains in manuscript until today (and contains A-theses). 
Moreover, Simons claims that Brentano was not a genuine producer of books. Never-
theless, he was a distinguished teacher and he was always fiercely engaged in matters 
close to his heart.15 This would in turn explain his devotion to Aristotelian writings, 
in the case of which – it has to be admitted – he was quite an effective producer of 
books (five books finished and published!). Brentano believed (and said so explic-
itly in the opening lines of his last book Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung) that 
he was Aristotle’s youngest son.16 He had two elder brothers, namely Eudemos and 
Theophrastus, with whom he engaged in a highly interesting discussion in his work 
Aristotle’s Psychology, 1867. This “family tree” was supposed to authorise him not 
only to comment on Aristotle and interpret Aristotle, but also to emend and supple-
ment Aristotle where he saw a need for it. He exercised this right using the Thomistic 
tools, and this more or less boils down to the outline of the A current.
Are A and B at all compatible? Do they have anything in common? 
In the very first pages of PES, Brentano formulates a question about the possibility 
of the continuation of the existence of our mental acts after the bodily death, which 
is basically a question about the immortal soul, only ... without the soul. The ques-
tion looks rather confusing against the background of the published books of PES, as 
there is nothing more on immortality on its pages. To cut a long story short: Brentano 
– not only in his Aristotelica, but also in the manuscripts for the unpublished books 
of PES – goes back (I use this expression to illustrate the fact that he chooses a theory 
rooted in the 13th century) to A as he sees himself defeated in his pursuit for dia-
chronic unity of consciousness which would be the key to immortality. He formulates 
an account of the synchronic unity of consciousness, meaning being aware of oneself 
and one’s mental acts at the specific moment in time. Unfortunately, the diachronic 
one is a problem, as there is no “glue” to hold the phenomena together over time, 
besides the boundaries of mortal body, and therefore they drift apart and we can no 
longer think of an immortal self. And thus the thing that guarantees A’s superiority 
14 See F. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, 
L.L. McAlister, London, New York 1995. With an Introduction by P. Simons.
15 See also S. Kamińska, Nieznane oblicze Franza Brentano...
16 See also ibidem and S. Kamińska, The Alleged Activity of Active Intellect – a Wild Goose Chase or 
a Puzzle to Be Solved? [in:] “Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce” 2014, vol. LIV, pp. 79–126.
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over B is the possibility of a plausible account of immortality, which Brentano, as 
a former Catholic priest and a consistent believer, simply could not let go. Brentano 
was a very religious person and he had, so to speak, an official and a private world 
view. In the end the strong belief of there being an immortal soul defeated the “of-
ficial philosophical programme”. 
As I discuss this issue in detail from the psychological and ontological standpoint 
elsewhere, here I will concentrate on another aspect of the matter, i.e. the relationship 
between science and religion.
How can a man who in his Habilitationsthesis claims that that the true method 
of philosophy should be no different from the method of natural science engage his 
personal views into philosophical constructs? Of course, Aquinas was a very logical, 
rational philosopher, but Brentano did not adopt his views because of these features, 
but rather because of his theism (see: the opening pages of Aristoteles Lehre vom 
Ursprung des menschlichen Geistes, where he unsuccessfully tries to defend himself 
from being called a Thomist). Rather than by the method of science, Brentano was 
driven by a personal motivation, a strong belief and an emotional need while formu-
lating the theses in A. Let me quote an interesting passage from A.J. Burgess’s paper 
Brentano as Philosopher of Religion: “Brentano owes and acknowledges a heavy 
debt to Aristotle and to the Thomistic tradition. This debt can hardly be overem-
phasized, but it can be misunderstood. Only in the widest sense could he be termed 
a Thomist. No doubt he himself would have rejected the title, and rightly so. Yet in 
essentials it is the Thomistic interpretation of Aristotle which he follows, for exam-
ple on the immortality of the individual soul and on the temporal17 creation of the 
world.”18 As I said above, Brentano indeed tried to reject the title, but he did it only in 
the face of accusation of not only being a Thomist, but of using Aristotle as the back-
ground against which Thomistic philosophy could be better exposed without a true 
regard for Aristotle. Nevertheless, in the same disclaimer-passage (p. 1 of Erster Teil 
of Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung des menschlichen Geistes) he expresses his true 
belief that Aquinas was a much better-suited and considerably more thorough-going 
Aristotelian scholar with a deeper insight than those who came after him. This is why 
I believe this passage to be at least ambiguous.19
A Bigger Picture 
In his deliberations on the immortality of the soul,20 where he fiercely defends the 
substantial account of an intellectual soul, Kazimierz Twardowski lists the philoso-
phers who were against it, i.e. in favour of bundle theory. Surprisingly, Brentano is not 
17 For an explanation of the word “temporal” see the footnote on creatio continua above.
18 A.J. Burgess, op.cit., p. 85.
19 It is worth noting that Burgess did not refer to the fragment I am dealing with here.
20 K. Twardowski, Filozofia współczesna o nieśmiertelności duszy [in:] “Przełom” 1895, vol. 1, no. 
14, pp. 427–438 oraz Metafizyka duszy [in:] “Przełom” 1985, vol. 1, no. 15, pp. 467–480 [in Polish]. 
These are two papers that form a unity, so to speak, and therefore should be read together.
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among them, although Twardowski was not only familiar with PES, but also engaged 
in developing its ideas,21 which can serve as further proof (besides Simons’s opinion 
on PES and the motivation behind it) that the Aristotelian part was much more impor-
tant for Brentano, and Twardowski – as his faithful follower – knew it. My personal 
belief is the same; however, it would be unfair and devoid of deeper sense and jus-
tification simply to dismiss Brentano’s best-known achievement as a whim, sudden 
change of mind, etc. Surely, even if there was a hidden agenda behind it, it must have 
been difficult for him to maintain two such different world views. 
Religion vs. science impartiality
Kazimierz Twardowski, who unlike his teacher was very much into meta-philosophy, 
proposed a solution to such problems, namely the rule of science vs. world-view 
impartiality. This can be expressed as follows: advocating this or that metaphysics 
is a matter of faith, not knowledge. Religion/world view and philosophy must be 
strictly divided. The premise behind this was the following: philosophy exercised in 
the metaphysical way is unable to justify its claims and theses. This lack of justifica-
tion contradicts the spirit of science.22
This was supposed to be an axiom in Twardowski’s school, and in most cases it 
worked. It should not be confused with the science/not-science distinction introduced 
by the Vienna Circle at that time (the Lvov-Warsaw School and the Vienna Circle are 
often compared, for which there are some good reasons, but not this one). For the 
members of the Vienna Circle science was a tool for defeating all metaphysics or – 
in the best-case scenario – identifying it with poetry. For the Lvov-Warsaw School 
it was about acknowledging what is scientific and thus can be a part of the “official 
programme” of the School, and what is private (and bound to stay this way) but with 
no qualitative justification. 
One must see the difference between defeating religion and including this reli-
gion-fight into one’s programme and simply not including religion in the scope of 
deliberation for metaphilosophical reasons.
However good and useful this impartiality rule may sound, even Twardowski 
himself did not manage to obey it all the time. Nevertheless he tried. It seems that 
Brentano, on the other hand, was not preoccupied with this issue. Or rather one 
should say that he did not care, because according to him there was no conflict. In 
his paper Brentano as a Religious Thinker, to which I referred above, A.J. Burgess 
quotes Brentano’s quite famous words, which I decided to use as a punchline here: 
In a letter to a young agnostic Brentano once cited approvingly the famous saying of Francis 
Bacon: “It is true, that a little philosophy inclineth man’s mind to atheism; but depth in phi-
21 In 1894 Twardowski developed, clarified and supplemented Brentano’s ideas from PES in his 
famous work and his Habilitationsschrift at the same time: On the Content and Object of Presentations 
– A Psychological Investigation (1894). He enriched Brentano’s act–object distinction with an object–
content distinction.
22 See also J. Woleński, Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School, Dordrecht/London 1989.
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losophy bringeth men’s mind about to religion.” Brentano himself might have put the point this 
way: bad philosophy, and particularly bad idealistic philosophy, inclines a man to atheism, but 
a rigorous and scientific philosophy will bring him back.23 
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